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Four Observations on Modern International Commercial
Policy Under Floating Exchange Rates
ABS TRACT
This paper describes the essential similarity between "modern" commer-
cial policy, with its rent—like revenues, and capital transfers. Import
barriers are shown to have consequently ambiguous effects on nominal
and real exchange rates. The paper also examines some important supply—
side welfare Costs and consequences of import barriers through their
influence on current asset prices and future capital formation.
The model on which the observations are based is an aggregated fixed—
endowment, full—employment, general—equilibrium model similar to those used
in the pure theory of international trade, with financial capital and for-
eign exchange markets that are integrated in a manner consistent with the
asset/portfolio—balance approach to exchange rates.
The model is empirically calibrated to reflect the U.S. and the rest
of the world in the early 1980's. In this empirical stylization, U.S. import
barriers are shown (1) to reduce national consumption possibilities more
significantly than is usually thought to be the case; (ii) to discourage U.S.
physical capital formation; and (iii) to have significant yet variable effects
on exchange rates, where the variability depends on the distribution between
the U.S. and the rest of the world of the rent—like revenues implicit in the
import barriers. It is notable that the more favorable this distribution to






This paper makes four observations on "modern" international com-
mercial policy under floating exchange rates. It describes the essen
tial similarity between such commercial policy and capital transfers,
and reveals its consequently ambiguous effects on nominal exchange
rates, the terms of trade, and national economic welfare. It also
examines some important supply—side costs and consequences of commer-
cial policy through its influence on current asset prices and future
capital formation.
The model on which the observations are based is an aggregated
fixed—endowment, full—employment, general—equilibrium model similar
to those used in the pure theory of international trade, with financial
capital and foreign exchange markets that are integrated in a manner
consistent with the asset/portfolio—balance approach to exchange rates.
Its most closely related antecedents are models by Boyer (1977),
Eichengreen (1980), and Djajic (1981).
In order to understand the likely magnitudes of the influences
being described, the model is empirically calibrated to reflect the U.S.
and the rest of the world in the early 1980's. In this empirical styli-
zation, U.S. import barriers are shown (1) to reduce national consumption
possibilities more significantly than is usually thought to be the case;
(ii) to discourage U.S. physical capital formation; and (iii) to have signi—
ficant yet variable effects on exchange rates, where the variability depends2
on the distribution between the U.S. and the rest of the world of the
rent—like revenues implicit in all import barriers.
"Modern" commercial policy is commercial policy with a prominent
quantitative element, and is examined to reflect several recent trends;
One is the increasing popularity of quota—based barriers(voluntary ex-
port restraints, orderly marketing agreements) and mechanistic admini-
strative guidelines (trigger prices for steel>among those clamoring
for protection. Another is the decreasing reliance that mostgovern-
ments place on international trade taxes for revenuepurposes, leading
them increasingly to be willing to restrict trade inways that create
windfall revenues for someone deemed deserving other than themselves
(including occasionally foreign governments). A third and less import-
ant trend for purposes of this paper is toward rules—based commercial
policies (variable levies for agricultural products, prescribed growth
rates for textile and auto imports) and toward temporary safeguardre-
lief from imports that all share in being variableyet anticipatable by
the private sector.
The following are the four observations that are the focus of the
work.
(1) Income transfers implicit in modern commercial policy are more
intricate and less innocuous than those implicit in tariffs, export sub-
sidies, and other tax—subsidy schemes.' Quantitative commercial policy
drives a wedge between world and domestic prices, generating rent—like3
revenues that can affect both private incentives and national economic
welfare. Foreign producers may collect most of the implied revenues for
example, from the "voluntary" export restraints that a protectionist
country presses them to administer. The country discriminated against
may even gain if the terms of trade turn sufficiently against the country
restricting its imports. And internally capital owners may gain relative
to labor if commercial policy's implicit revenues fall directly to them
and if labor has little market power. (Modern commercial policymay thus
have a direct effect on industrial profitability that tariffs do not have,
given that their revenues are distributed in a manner closer to distribu-
tional neutrality.)
(2) Income transfers implicit in modern commercial policy create an
international transfer problem. This classic problem (described briefly
below) provides a revealing and realistic setting in which to examine
the effects of commercial policy (a focus of pure trade theory) under
floating exchange rates (a focus of international finance). International
transfers are generally "effected" by adjustment of commodity and asset
prices, including the exchange rate. These price/exchange—rate adjust-
ments in turn influence real trade, including trade in assets that are
claims to deferred real purchasing power. The adjustments also influence
real incomes, real wealth, and even real factor endowments.
(3) Modern commercial policy can either strengthen or weaken a
currency.2 Neither its effect on exchange rates nor the subsequent
feedback of exchange—rate adjustment onto the variables targetted for4
influence by commercial policy are as straightforward as journalistic
disputation, common intuition, or familiar general—equilibrium logic
often suggest. The intuitive position is that protectionism strengthens
a country's currency and hence "undoes itself."
[Export—related] jobs... would be lost by limiting
imports.... If they [Japanese exporters] earn fewer
dollars, the demand for yen goes down and the price
of yen in terms of dollars also tends to go down...
U.S. goods become more expensive to Japanese and
they buy fewer of them, and jobs are lost in ex-
port industries. (Friedman (1981)).
A protective structure... is likely in the first
instance to create an external surplus. This
then requires an appreciation of the exchange
rate to restore external balance. (Corden (1971,
p. 105)).
The general—equilibrium position is that the exchange-rate system is a
red herring in calculating the effects of commercial policy, since in
the most familiar general—equilibrium models, exchange—rate changes
are neutral.3 In this view the exchange rate is the relative price of
two assets, both of which are "veils." Therefore whatever the effects
of commercial policy on exchange rates, if any, its effect on equilibrium5
values of real variables is always the same. If the point is granted,
it then makesaboutas much sense to write a paper on "Conunercial
Policy Under Floating Exchange Rates" as on "Commercial Policy Under
Variable Tides."
(4) Modern commercial policy can either encourage or discourage
aggregate capital formation. Import barriers clearly raise prices of
domestic and imported output, and may either raise or reduce equity
prices by which the current capital stock is valued. The ratio of
physical capital's market value to its replacement cost (Tobin's "q,"
with commodity prices measuring replacement costs) is thus Sensitive
to commercial policy.Cost—of—adjustment/installation theories
of physical investment (Tobin (1969), Lucas (1967), and Treadway (1969))
suggest that the long—run capital endowment and aggregate supply will
rise when q rises temporarily above 1 and fall when q falls temporarily
below 1, in both instances restoring its equilibrium value at 1. For
reasons discussed below, import barriers can be generally presumed to
be stagflationary, reducing q below 1 in some medium run, discouraging
capital formation, and undermining confidence in development/takeoff
strategies built around import substitution. Furthermore when this is
true, then an additional welfare cost of protection in the long run
is the reduced income per worker that accompanies reduced physical capital
per worker.
Since the second, third, and fourth observations are less familiar6
than the first, it is worth summarizing briefly their explanations.
First and most simply, if modern protectionism allows foreign exporters
to capture a sufficiently large share of the policy's implicit revenues,
then it is possible that widespread barriers to imports will raise their
f.o.b. value (tariffs never do).4 This influence by itself would create
additional foreign—exchange—market demand for foreign currency and de-
preciation of domestic currency. A given set of import barriers then
becomes more effective at quelling trade under floating exchange rates
than under fixed exchange rates, not less.
But this perspective is limited. It neglects the most important
influence underlying this paper. A significant change in commercial
policy causes a change in international asset preference as well.5
The ensuing short—run exchange—rate change under floating must be
consistent simultaneously with the implied changes in: (1) commodity
trade; (ii) capital movements; and (iii) domestic—currency prices of
globally traded assets. In the longer run it must also ultimately be
consistent with the change in debt service on the new equilibrium asset
positions. This is where the transfer perspective becomes important.
In the short run, if barriers to imports cause a larger incipient capital—
account deficit than current—account surplus, ceteris paribus, then
domestic currency may depreciate to restore equilibrium in the foreign
exchange market. And/or if barriers to imports cause excess domestic
demand to hold liquid tradeable assets, and excess foreign supply,7
ceteris paribus, then domesticcurrency may depreciate to restore global
portfolio equilibrium for asset stocks.
Finally, the invariance of real equilibria to exchange rates will
not be a property of the perspective taken below.Exchange—rate changes
will not be neutral. They will produce capitalgains and losses, not
only on net international indebtedness (Boyer (1977)), but even, through
substitutability, on domestic equity claims to the capital stock. This
is the key to understanding how commercial policy might affect the capital
endowment through temporary divergences in the ratio of capital's market
value to its replacement cost. And ultimately, a portion of national in—
come, international interest earnings or debt service, will not vary
proportionately with exchange rates or the price level.6
AN ILLUSTRATIVE MODEL
The conclusions are illustrated by reference toa bilateral macro-
economic model7 with explicit foreign repercussion effects. Each
country's outputs are aggregated, but can be sold at a differentprice
abroad than at home due to the price discrimination that isimplicit in
quantitative commercial policy. Imports are viewed as imperfect sub-
stitutes in consumption for domestic goods.
Some familiar questions about the industry—specific motivation for
commercial policy and its sectoral consequences are obviouslysuppressed.
Yet responsiveness of excess supplies and demands to relativeprices is
preserved by the assumption that twodifferentiated products are consuned.8
And in every other dimension, an effort has been made to align the model
as closely as possible with familiar general—equilibrium real trademodels:
in the medium—term equilibrium that characterizes the model (see below),
endowments of two factors of production are fixed and fully" employed
(at natural rates of unemployment and capacity utilization), current
accounts are balanced, and expectations are stable. It can be easily
shown that all four observations around which the paper is built would
continue to apply to changes in commercial policy in a multisectoral
model with differentiated exportables, importables, and nontradeables,
andwith industry—specific commercial policy.
The most important feature of the paper's perspective is its insis-
tence onthe exchange rate •being viewed as an asset price, and its focus
on some ways in which modern commercial policy might affect assetmarkets.9
A converse perspective deserves brief emphasis. Exchange—market flux
may influence commercial policy. It can be argued thatthe strongest poli-
tical pressure for protectionism emanates from specific sectors of the
economy. Each industry views itself as having verylittleinfluence over
the exchange rate. Yet they are painfully aware of the exchange rate's in-
fluence on them. Depreciation and appreciation due to asset market flux
cause ebbs and flows in competitiveness, cash flow, and long—term economic
viability. To the extent that there are inter—temporal and capital—market
distortions that set limits to the maximum losses consistent with any firm's
survival, floating exchange rates may heighten corporate, sectoral,and
ultimately collective political pressure for protection, especially of a modern
(quantitative) kind.9
This line of thought runs counter to familiar arguments that floating
exchange rates undermine balance—of—payments and aggregate—employment de-
fenses for government trade policy:
Flexible exhange rates eliminate the balance—of—
payments motive for tariffs and should therefore
facilitate further rounds of negotiations to lower
trade barriers (Dudley (1981, p. 264), ascribing the
view to Richard Blackhurst)
The great advantage of a floating exchange rate system
was to have been that the adjustment would take place
automatically through currency appreciations and de-
preciations, removing the need for otherwise undesirable
trade and capital controls, and allowing governments to
concentrate their policies on domestic economic needs.
Thus if the adjustment process is working well, trade
measures for balance of payments purposes are unnecessary
and undesirable. (Frank, Pearson, and Riedel (1979),
p. 15).
Oneofthe major arguments for a flexible exchange rate
system ...isthat it makes the case for free trade clear
and simple. If you have a flexible rate and you reduce
tariffs, movements in the exchange rate will automatically10
protect you against having any adverse balance of pay-
ments effects, and therefore you are not exporting or
importing unemployment (Friedman (1969), p. 118).
These arguments notwithstanding, floating exchange rates may aggravate
sectoral pressures for protection by responding flexibly to international
asset trade and thereby channeling intense competitive pres-
sure toward domestic sectors through unfavorable movements in the "real"
exchange rate (relative foreign to domestic commodity prices). The point
is exemplified in the late 1970's by hardpressed Swiss and German manu-
facturers suffering from massive portfolio shifts toward francs and marks.
We proceed to discuss the model, beginning with the allocation of
nationally unique production to the two markets in which it is sold. In
the medium—term perspective of most trade models, production possibilities
(Q.) are exogenously fixed by assumptions of "full" employment and ideal
capacity utilization coupled with stationary endowments of all factors of
production.
Q. =D.+D..; where (1.1)
1ii':i
Q. units of output produced uniquely in country i, net of
real replacement investment to hold the physical capital
stock stationary;
D.. =domesticconsumption of domestic output;
D.. =foreignconsumption of domestic output; i's exports to
j; j's imports from i.11
In the discussion below,D11 and D22 vary endogenously, and D12 and D21
are treated as the exogenous instruments of commercial policy. Non—
quantitative trade barriers can be easily translated into their"quota
equivalents." This is true even for tariffs and exportsubsidies, as
can be seen by defining each country's income in a conventional(e.g.,

















Pjj price of country i's (unique) product in j's market and
in j's currency;
=countryl's share of the "revenues" implied by commercial
policy concerning its own exports (i's imports), e.g.,
for tariffs, 0. =0,for voluntary export restraints,
01 may approach 1;
e theexchange rate, the price of 2's currency in units of
11Scurrency;12
F=l'snet financial claim on 2; the stock of internationally—
traded assets held by 1 as claims on 2; 2's net indebtedness
to 1; number of such assets promising to pay c per period;
where
c=periodiccoupon payment per unit of assets, payable in l's
currency.
For tariffs whose proceeds are redistributed as income transfers, all commer-
cial policy revenues are collected and disbursed by the domestic government,
so that the foreign country's share of such revenues, or 62P is zero. It
is also zero for export subsidies financed by taxes. In these cases the first
and second line of each Y. definition add to p .Q,andthe third line re—
1 iii
presentstariff revenues or domestic taxes to finance export subsidies.
For quantitative barriers to imports or exports, however, each country
has an opportunity to claim its portion of the implied revenues (or "quota
rents") that arise from the wedge that commercial policy drives between world
and domestic prices, These shares no doubt vary from policy to policy, from
good to good, and from time to time. It is likely that 0. is relatively
large for commercial policies administered by the exporting country (volun—
tary export restraints) and smaller for those administered by the importing
country (import quotas, government purchasing policy). 0. is also likely to
be large for goods in which the exporter industry has significant market
power compared to importers, for example where export sales are centralized
in a national marketing board, or where they are exempt from anti—monopoly
policy. Despite the clearly endogenous character of 0.'s, modelling their13
determinants is beyond the scope of this paper, and they are treated para—
11
metrically below.
The variable F plays an important role in explaining certain unfamiliar
conclusions below. F can be more elaborately described as the internation-
ally held portion of a broad pool of "inside" paper assets ——unsecured
institutional bonds and notes, government securities, bank loans, etc. —
"inside"in the sense that they are simultaneous claims and liabilities of
national residents, and enter national wealth only when held internationally.
Variation in the price of F in each country creates some of the capital
gains and losses that make the real consequences of commercial policy sen-
sitive to the exchange rate, not invariant to it as in simpler general—
equilibrium settings. Variation in the price of F in each country's currency
(Pf1 Pf2) must be furthermore consistent with exchange rate variation
(specifically, ePf2 must always equal Pf1 a condition equivalent to perfect
mobility of financial capital). In fact, one way of describing the exchange
rate is as the relative price of internationally—traded paper assets in the
two countries, a definition that accords well with the asset approach to ex-
change rates. Finally, variations in the actual and desired quantities of F
as a result of commercial policy's impact on income (Y.) and rates of return
are the counterbalance to the income transfers implicit in modern commercial
policy, determining whether such transfers are under— or over—effected, and
thereby determining asset prices and the direction of exchange—rate variation.
cF represents periodic interest earnings on country l's net international
investment position, or alternatively, l's balance of payments on services14
account.12Since the equilibrium described by the model is stationary with
respect to time, interest earnings are assumed to be entirely repatriated,
not reinvested.
The behavior summarized by equations (3) and (4) further undermines
the neutrality of commercial policy's impacts to exchange—rate variation
and other financial flux.
c/Pf1 r1; (3.1)
c/ePf2 r2; (3.2)
r. .Y./pk.K.; where; (4,1)
Pfj the price of tradeable financial assets in i's
currency;
C/Pf1 c/ePf2 =impliedinterest rates in country 1 and country
2respectively;
r. =theiip1ied rate of return on nontradeable
"equities"in country i, where equities are
defined as (secured) ownership claims to the
nation's capital stock;
=theelasticity of output with respect to capital
inan (implicitly Cobb—Douglas) aggregate pro-
duction function.
cx1Y1
=aggregaterental payments to capital on the
assumptionthat capital is paid the value of
itsmarginal product;15
K. =thecapital stock in numbers of machines, or
equivalently, the number of equity claims to
the capital stock;
ki
=the"stoc1narket" price of a nontradeable equity
claim in i's currency.
Equations(3) require that rates of return on unsecured financial assets
and equity claims to the capital stock be identical, niaking them perfectly
substitutable ways of holding stores of future purchasing power. The assump—
tionismade primarily for analytical convenience. Some substitutibilitycan
certainly be defended by reference to domestic arbitrage across alternative
savings instrUments)3 The exchange rate has a clear relation to rates of
returnon equities through (3), and they in turn have a clear relation to
14
commercial policy through the presence of income (Y) in (4).
The important point is that modern commercial policy alters domestic
income distribution for all the normal reasons plus one ——itcreates oppor-
tunities for income alternative to physical production)5 These rent—related
opportunities influence asset prices (equations (4)) and exchange rates
(equations (3)), and can in turn be moderated or exagerated by exchange—rate
variation. As discussed below, these rent—related opportunities may also
affect capital formation in the long run, creating a link between commercial
policy, exchange rates, and growth.
The remainder of the model is more familiar, reflecting conventional
assumptions about economic behavior. Equations (5) and (6) represent conven-





() = i'saverage propensity to import out of aggre-
gate nominal expenditure (absorption);
E. =l'saggregate nominal expenditure (absorption);
() >0 (<0)when import demand is own—price elastic (inelastic);
p.,D.,. =[1—.(p../p..)]E,. (6.1)
Equations (7) capture an asset approach to the current account, that de-
ficits must be financed by foreign borrowing of some sort, reflecting a
willingness to draw down national wealth toward some lower desired level
(Wd. <W1),and that surpluses imply net foreign investment, reflecting
a desire to increase wealth toward some desired level)6
E. =E.(W./W.)Y.; where (7.1) 1 i di i i.
Wdi,WI
=i'sdesired and actual aggregate nominal wealth;
E( )<0,and E.,(l) =1,so that current accounts are balanced
when desired and actual wealth are equal.









kl K1 + Pf1F; (9.1)
W2
=
L2+k2 K2 —pf2F;where (9.2)
L1
=countryi's stock of nominal cashbalances, treated
exogenously;17
Arid equations (10), in conjunction with (8) and (9),17 explain aggregate





=countryi's real wealth, nominal wealth deflated
by an index of consumables prices;
P1
=theprice level or cost of living, defined as
+'—1)(p/p)where a o super—
script denotes a base—period value;18
L./3r. (0;aL./(W,/P.) •(W./P.)/L.>0and <1.19
Although the presence of bothincomeand wealth as determinants of the de-
mand for money is unconventional in the closed—economy U.S. literature
Ne1tzer (1963), Brunner and Meltzer (1963), Goldfeld (1973, pp. 613—615).
Laidler (1977, pp. 139—142)), it has considerably more precedent in the asset!
portfolio—balance approach to modelling open—economies (Branson (1977, p. 72),
Kouri (1977, Equations (3) and (6.1)), and Henderson (1980, Equation (4)).










L Is the time difference operator over the same interval as that
for which the "flow" data are measured.18
ALTERNATIVE HORIZONS
The model admits of three different horizons over which one could
answer the question "what are the effects of modern commercial policy
(an exogenous change in D12 or D21) under floating exchange rates?"
This paper focusses on the second of the three alternatives because it
is the horizon most frequently associated with trade—theoretic discussions
of commercial policy.
(1) A short—run response would treat the capital stocks (K1) as
exogenous, and net international indebtedness as exogenous as well on the
grounds that for some sufficiently small interval of time, F (the "real"
current account/capital account balance) is infinitesimal relative to F
and pkjKi/pfj. During the short run, desired wealth would not be equal
to actual wealth, and current account/capital account imbalance would
be the means by which W "chases" Wd. Asset prices, e, fi' and ki would
be completely flexible in the short run. Expectations could be made
endogenous by forcing these asset prices to short—run equilibrium levels
such that their subsequent rates of change during the interim between
short— and medium—run equilibria (see below) would maintain equality of
yields across perfectly substitutable assets (where "yields" include
not only interest payments and rental payments, but also capital gains!
20
losses).
(2) A medium—run response could be distinguished from a short—run
response by recognizing that net international indebtedness (F) would19
eventually attain a value consistent with equality of desired and actual
wealth. At that point, current and capital accounts would be in balance.
The capital stock might21 remain exogenous during the medium run and
asset prices would adjust flexibly to an equilibrium consistent with
the new level of international indebtedness. Such medium—run equilibria
are the ones most frequently analyzed in comparative static pure trade
theory, and it generally maintains an additional assumption of stable
expectations. This paper follows suit in order to stay as close as
possible to the most frequently referenced literature. But a more sen— —
sible,if cumbersome, alternative would be to make expectations endogenous
after the fashion of the account above, forcing asset prices to medium—
run levels such that their subsequent rates of change between medium—
and long—run equilibria (see below) would leave no profit for arbitrage
across substitutable assets.
(3) A long—run response might21 be distinguished from a medium—run
response by recognizing the mechanisms in this model by which commer-
cial policy could encourage or discourage net capital formation. In
particular, if the capital stock (K) represents accumulated foregone
consumption of domestic goods from the past, and if it can be measured
in units of domestic output, then commercial policy can create a short—
and medium—run divergence between the market value of existing capital
(pu) and its replacement/acquisition cost (1).22Theratio of market
value to replacement cost is precisely "Tobin's q." (Tobin20
(1969),Lucas (1967), Treadway (1969)). Values greater than one create
incentives for capital formation (larger K1) and expansion of aggregate
supply. Values less than one create incentives for net real disinvest—
ment (small I) and contraction of aggregate supply. The long—run equili-
brium position of the economy as a result of commercial policy could be
calculated as the value of K. and other variables for which kj'jj
returned to 1.
Another way of distinguishing shorter and longer runs is conceivable,
but is not followed here. One could define the shorter run as a period
in which domestic prices are rigid (p11 exogenous) and aggregate output
is flexible (Q1 endogenous), and the longer run conversely as is done
in the paper, with Q1 being set at a level corresponding to "natural"
unemploymentandexcess capacity. Then shorter—run changes in would
correspond closely to output/employment flux, and longer—run changes in
would correspond closely to price flux. One interesting insight from such a
view is that when downward price rigidity is more marked than upward
price rigidity (as seems likely), then trade policy could be largely
recessionary in the country where Y falls, and largely inflationary in
the country where Y rises, with global effects that net to world stagfla—
tion (the recession in the contracting country dominates the expansion
in the expanding country, and the rise in prices in the latter dominates
the price stability in the former.)
SHORT—A1D MEDIUM-RUN CONCLUSIONS "IN PRINCIPLE"
Commercial policy in the model described above operates inaway21
that recalls the well—established literature on the transfer question.
Modern commercial policy is an income transfer mechanism among nations,
with no fiscal impacts unless the government auctions off import quota
rights or taxes the "windfall" revenues that accrue to importers or ex-
porters. Quantitative restrictions on exports and imports are an even
purer beggar—your—neighbor policy than taxes (which domestic residents
pay in part), causing price (and perhaps output) responses that redistri-
bute world income and alter the terms of trade in a direction that depends
on who collects the implicit revenues. As with all redistributions of
income internationally, there will be increased purchases of imports and
stock demands for certain assets where Y rises, and the opposite where Y
falls. The traditional transfer question is whether the asset trade
implied by the change in the current account (i) falls short of, (ii)
matches, or (iii) exceeds the explicit (financial) capital inflows to
one country and outflows from the other. In historical analyses, the
terms of trade of the country where Y fell were expected to adjust un-
favorably, not at all, or favorably depending on whether the income
transfer was "undereffected" (i), "just effected" (ii), or "overeffected"
(iii). Currency depreciation/appreciation in the foreign exchange market
wasseentraditionally as the agent of terms—of—trade deterioration/
improvement. Andnationaleconomic welfare improved or declined as the
termsoftrade did.
International redistribution of rent—like revenues from modern com-
mercial policy is what ties it inextricably to the transfer question.22
These rent—like revenues are at the heart of a striking, althoughfami-
liar conclusion.23 Import barriers may not bring about arise in a
country's income. They may in fact reduce income if theyaward the foreign
country an opportunity to collect the wedgecreated between world and
domestic prices of its own exports. Voluntary export restraintsand
orderly marketing agreements, of course, often do exactlythat. In this
case also, import barriers make the trade balance morenegative in the
short run,24 counter to common intuition and often counter to oneof the
stated purposes of the policy. Parameters that play a keyrole in
generating this unusual conclusion, in addition tothe shares of "quota
rents" that each country claims from the commercial policy of theother
(Qi, 62), are the price elasticity ofdemand for imports (reflected in
the elasticity of ft()), theaverage propensities to import (),and
25
the relative sizes of the two countries (as measured by Y1/eY2).
The upshot is that in some circumstances, the moststimulative
trade policy for income and the trade balance may be thedismantling
of quantitative trade barriers and all manner of non—pricediscrimina-
tion against foreign producers. One cannot even rulethis out as a para-
metric improbability.
The conclusion has more than macroeconomic interest.In a multi—
sectoral general—equilibrium model, import barriers that areaimed at
protecting output or employment in any particularsector can fail if
they give foreign competitors too large ashare of the implicit revenues.
At the higher prices for the imported product andfor its domestic23
substitute, there may be less purchasing power facing domestic competi—
tors, not more. And the sectoral trade balance may deteriorate further.
Whatever commercial policy's short—run effects on the trade balance
and income, it is these variables that drive most of the others in the
model. But the direction of their impact is not unambiguous. The am-
biguity arises from the transfer problem. And the most important vari-
ables affected by the transfer problem are asset prices, including the
exchange rate. Neither the short-run nor medium—run response of the
exchange rate to commercial policy is determinately signed, as we now proceed to
describe. The point and others in this section can be shown morepre-
cisely by algebraic manipulation of the equations in Appendix A.
The immediate influence of commercial policy is to raise one country's
trade balance and hence income (say l's, without loss of generality)
and lower the other's. Higher income in 1 generates a demand for cash
(equation (10.1)) and for acquisition of non—money assets (equation (8.1))
that forces adjustment of equities prices (in particular and of any
commodities prices that are flexible (altering the price index
P1).
Equity—price adjustment may be up or down, even under stable expectations,
depending on the relative strengths of extra demands for cash (downward
pressure on and for non—money assets (upward pressure on
Commodity—price adjustment may alter income further, although not so drama-
tically as to offset the rise due directly to commercial policy.
Higher income in 1 generates a "desired" capital—account deficit!24
current—account surplus in order to import additional wealth (equation
7.1)) over the medium run (this effect remains despite any additional
wealth created by potential capital gains on equities). But the desired
current—account surplus may be greater or less than the actual current—
account surplus created by the commercial policy in the first instance.
This difference between desired and actual trade in assets from l's point
of view forces adjustment of the tradeable asset's price in l's currency,
Pf1 that can be in either direction, even under stableexpectations.26
In 2, lower income generates a stock demand for less cash (equation
10.2)) and smaller desired net wealth (equation (8.2)). These force
adjustment of flexible equities prices and commodities prices. There
remains, however, after these adjustments, an incentive in 2 for additional
indebtedness to 1 (larger F). This can of course be realized through
capital—account surpluses/current—account deficits (equation (7.2)).
But the desired current—account deficit may be greater or less than the
actual deficit that commercial policy has created for 2. This difference
between desired and actual trade in assets from 2's point of view forces
adjustment of the tradeable asset's price in 2's currency, f 2' that can
be in either direction.
The upshot is that the exchange rate, the relative price of inter-
nationally traded assets (Pf1/Pf2) can be altered by commercial policy
in either direction in the short run. The direction in which the ex-
change rate moves depends on a comparison of the actual capital movements
that commercial policy causes through current account alterations to thedesired capital movements for each country that commercial policy alsocause:.
These desired capital movements must be consistent with the income trans-
fers (and price adjustments) that commercial policy brings about in the
first place through the current account.
It is interesting that, in contrast to Boyer (1977), Djajic (1981),
and many others, none of these conclusions depends qualitatively on whether
a country is a creditor (as is 1) or a debtor (as is 2), as long as the
debtor nation's capital stock exceeds the value of its net international
indebtedness (pK2 —Pf2F>O).The peculiar dependence of results on net
international indebtedness in many papers with a similar flavor to this
one27may rest on the neglect of freely—owned, "unattached" national net
worth.
The short—run effects of commercial policy on interest rates and equity
yields (r.) can also be positive or negative, just as are the capital val-
uation effects Imposed by adjustment of and Pf1. Since much modern
commercial policy can be anticipated (see the introduction), some of these
adjustments to asset prices, including exchange—rate adjustments, might
actually lead the commercial policy in time. They would also be stretched
out in smaller increments per period the earlier tFe anticipation can be
formed (see, for analogy, Fischer (1979), Wilson (1979)). Since theexc
rate would then be adjusting slowly to an anticipated level that is eit
higher or lover than it would be without commercial policy, current—acco
and income deviations from trend may have the oppOsite sign inanticipati:
of commercial policy from the sign that they have subsequent to itsimpl-i:
tation, This of course further complicates the issue of what modernc26
policy does to income and the current account. Not only do rent—like rev-
enues matter, but so do anticipations of commercial policy.
The analogy to the transfer problem should now be even clearer. Coin—
mercial policy, like exogenous shocks to the capital account, creates a
change in asset trade that must be accomodated in the short run. In both
the transfer problem and commercial policy the implied income effects and
their disposition for goods and asset purchases may be large enough that
induced international trade in goods and assets just matches the exogenous
shock to it (with the opposite sign). Or it may not, in which case pressures
will be brought to bear on asset prices in each country and on the exchange
rate to induce compensatory goods and asset trade.
The important conclusion for commercial policy from the transfer per-
spective is that exchange rate changes may not dampen any of its effects,
in contrast to what is apparently most economist's intuition. There is no
clear answer to whether or not coimnercial policy is less effective (for any
purpose) or less politically appealing under floating exchange rates than
under fixed.
The medium—run effects of commercial policy on the exchange rate are
just as troublesome. The rate may be higher or lower than before the conuner—
cial policy.28 Since, however, over time both countries approach equality
of actual and desired asset holdings (equations (8)), l's period—by—period
offers to buy F (through capital—account deficits) will be gradually smaller
as will 2's period—by--period offers to sell F (through capital—account sur—
pluses), Pf1 will fall over time and Pf2 will rise, leading l's "currency"
to appreciate gradually relative to 2's from whatever its short—run value27
would have been otherwise. While this seems closer to common intuition
regarding the effect of commercial policy on the exchange rate, it is
not really closer. Intuition suggests an immediate and indefiniteappre-
ciation of l's currency from its original value. The present modelsuggests
instead immediate appreciation or depreciation, followed by gradualappre-
ciation over time, and culminating in a value for l's currency thatmay
be higher or lower than its original value.
As another implication of restoring equilibrium to stock demands for
and supplies of assets, current account surpluses and deficits will vanish
in the medium run. This effect alone would tend to restore national incomes
toward their levels prior to commercial policy. But commercial policy will
have caused country 1 to accumulate additional F claims andcountry 2 to
incur additional F liabilities in the medium run. Country l's earningson
these additional assets (c times the growth in F) will keep its income higher
than it was prior to the commercial policy, and perhaps even higher than
during the short run after the commercial policy (i.e., l's income level
could rise immediately and then gradually over time). Country 2's additional
debt service payments (c times the growth in F/e) will keep its income lower
than it was prior to the commercial policy, and perhaps even lower than its
immediate post—policy short—run value.
It is clear from this account that commercial policy will cause apos-
itive medium—run change in the international services account balance for
country 1, whose net international claims rise. This change persists in-
definitely. And correspondingly, commercial policy will cause a negative
and indefinite change in the same account for country 2, whose net international28
indebtedness rises. The more interesting complement to this conclusion
is that commercial policy causes the merchandise trade balance ofcountry
1 to be more negative during and indefinitely after the mediumrun, and
the merchandise trade balance of country 2 to be ultimately and indef-
initely more positive. Commercial policy that improves the medium—term
income position of a country causes the trade balance todeteriorate, and
conversely. To put it somewhat loosely, one cannot be a protectionist in
the medium run on both nationalist and mercantilist grounds. Or looser
still, commercial policy aimed at protecting domestic producers of goods
will nevertheless lead services (capital services) to have alarger share
of medium term exports.
LONG—RUN CONCLUSIONS "IN PRINCIPLE"
When the long run is defined as above, then commercial policy has the
potential also for affecting capital formation and aggregate supply. One
mechanismby which itmight do so is a change in "Tobin's q," the ratio
ofthe market price of a claim to the existing capital stock to the
market price of a replacement piece of capital(p11, assumingthat output
andcapital are the same commodity before capital is "sealed" in place). As
we have seen, import barriers can eitherraise or lover stock—market prices
inthe short and medium runs, depending onparameter values. But
theireffect ondomesticprices (p..)is more predictable. Import barriers
tendto raise domestic prices as frustrated import demand spills over into
domestic production of substitutes. (Theexceptionalcase where import
barriers can lower is more likely the more price—inelastic is import29
demand and/or the larger is the share of implied revenues that foreigners
take (i.e., the larger is 01, 02).) Thus there is a presumption in this
model that import barriers reduce the ratio of the market value of capital
to its replacement cost. This finding is noteworthy because it suggests
that import barriers can be stagflationary in their long—run effects, re-
ducing the capital stock and aggregate supply.
This does not seem to be the place to discuss the open—economy impacts
of the capital formation and destruction that commercial policy prompts
during the transition from medium— to long—run equilibrium by changing
asset valuation and capital—goods prices. But it is worth pointing out
that the exchange rate interacts with all other asset prices in this model,
in a manner described by equations (3) and (4). There is thus clear inter-
dependence in the trajectories over time of exchange rates, equity prices,
'and flexible goods prices that make possible a number of alternative pre-
dictions for the long—run effects of commercial policy on exchange rates.
Finally, the distinction drawn above between medium—run and long—run
consequences of commercial policy may seem at this point too sharp. The
effects of commercial policy on capital formation and aggregate supply are
not necessarily slower in reaching fruition than is the elimination of
current—account imbalance through asset (F) trade. These adjustments may
well occur simultaneously, contrary to the implied assumption of standard
and familiar trade—theoretic models that current—account balance will be
attained with fixed factor endowments. Any overlapping of medium—term
capital—stock adjustment with medium—term current—account adjustment of30
course alters the pattern of the latter, and alters also the concomitant
adjustment of exchange rates and other asset prices.
MEDIUM—RUN CONCLUSIONS "IN PRACTICE"
The transfer aspects of modern commercial policy make many of its
consequences conditional on circumstances and parameters. The important
questions then become how likely some of the more anomalous consequences
really are, and how quantitatively significant. To answer such questions,
the model was empirically paranieterized to make country 1 reflect a stylized
"United States," and country 2,astylized "rest of the world," in the late
1970's. The details of the empirical parameterization are found in Appendix.
B. Its implications for quantitative medium—run multipliers are summarized in
Table 1. Each entry in the table is the medium—run elasticity of an endo—
genous variable with respect to an exogenous reduction in imports (that is,
the signs of the elasticities with respect toD12 and are reversed
in order to capture the effects of lower D12 and D21). Medium—run multi-
pliers are highlighted because they correspond to what would be obtained
from adding asset markets and explicit foreign exchange transactions to the
most familiar fixed—endowment, balanced—trade, general—equilibrium models
of commercial policy.
Several findings are notable.
(1) There is no sign ambiguity in the way import barriers affect U.S.
nominal income (Y1). But in the face of a fixed money stock, the quantita-
tive impact is very small. A ten percent shrinkage of imports is calculated
to increase U.S. nominal income by less than two tenths of one percent.
(2) "Real" U.S. income (consumption possibilities)29 is by contrast,31
Table1
ESTIMATED DItJN-RtJN PERCENTAGE EFFECTS OF
AONE PERCENT REDUCTION IN IMPORTS CD12, D21)
U.S. Imports (D21) Rest—of—World Imports (D12)
Distribution of
a Distribution of
Rent—Like Revenues Rent—Like Revenuesa
0=00 0.50 =1 0.=O0 =0.5O.=1 I i 1 1 1 1
Nominal Income
—U.S.
(Y1) 0.01525 0.01514 0.01247 —0.01596—0.01744—0.01338
—Rof W (Y2) —0.00213—0.00225—0.00491 0.00229 0.00081 0.00487
Exchange Rate Ce)1.106 1.047 —0.363 —1.139 —1.921 0.225
Net U.S.
FinancialClaims0.3333 0.3192 —0.0224 —0.3444 —0.5338 —0.0143
onR of W (F)
Global Interest 0.00297 0.00281—0.00100 -0.00306—0.00517 0.00063
Rates (r1r2)
Tobin's q
—u.s. —0.0505 —0.0504 —0.0466 0.1287 0.1308 0.1250




—U.S. —0.1596 —0.1324 —0.1116 0.2353 0.2199 0.1172
—Rof W 0.0743 0.0539 0.0357 —0.0481 —0.0574 —0.0375
a =0records effects when residents of the region restricting its imports
collect all the implied rent—like revenues, e.g., as for a one percent
reduction in imports brought about by a tariff of the appropriate size.
0.=0.5records effects when residents of the region restricting its imports collect
1 half of the implied rent—like revenues, with the remainder going to resi-
dents of the other region.
=1records effects when residents of the region restricting its imports
collect none of the implied rent—like revenues, i.e., when that region's
terms of trade decline (maximally) from its import barriers because its
trading partners take advantage of monopoly or political power to discrim-
inate perfectly and charge the full price that their customers' restricted
market will bear, approximated most closely by voluntary export quotas.
bOr real national economic welfare. See text and footnote 29 for calculation.32
significantly reduced by import barriers, falling by as much as 1.6 percent
from a ten percent reduction in imports. This figure is considerably larger
than most traditional estimates of the welfare cost of U.S. trade barriers.
Virtually all of its magnitude is due to increased import prices, hardly
offset at all by higher nominal income in the U.S. Import prices are higher
whether imports are restricted by tariffs (O =0)or by the most extreme
voluntary export quotas (O =1).In the former case, dollar depreciation
more than offsets lower prices for importables in foreign currency (p22) that
U.S. import barriers force abroad. In the latter case, the U.S. is forced as
a nation to pay foreign suppliers the full higher dollar price of imports
that import barriers force domestically. It is the exchange—rate
effects of commercial policy that cause the curious conclusion that the
welfare cost of import barriers is greater the larger the U.S. share of their
rent—like revenues.
(3) Contrary to most familiar intuition, U.S. tariffs and other import
barriers can cause equilibrium dollar depreciation in the medium term. The
effects are quantitatively the most dramatic in the table, with the only
elasticities greater than one. In the two cases where import barriers cause
dollar depreciation, the nominal income transfer from the rest of the world
to the U.S. is large enough to increase U.S. portfolio demand for tradeable
financial assets (F) even though real wealth effects work to reduce it (see
below). The income transfer drives up the dollar value of tradeable assets
and drives down their foreign—currency value (Pf2) forcing dollar
depreciation (e =Pf1/Pf2).
When, however, foreigners seize most of the
rent—like revenues from U.S. commercial policy (0. =1),the nominal income33
transfer to the U.S. is smaller and is swamped by lower real wealth in the
U.S. and higher real wealth abroad (see below). U.S. portfolio demand for
tradeable financial assets falls, as does their dollar price. Their foreign
currency price and the foreign—exchange value of the dollar rise.
(4) Equilibrium real U.S. wealth is reduced in the medium run by import
barriers in exactly the same proportion as real income, given their propor-
tionality in equations (8). Import barriers can impoverish a region not
only in current purchasing power, but also in future purchasing power.
(5) Real U.S. income and wealth would be reduced even further in the
long run, when account is taken of the shrinkage in the physical capital
stock that import barriers cause by depressing Tobin's q ——theratio of
capital's market value to its replacement cost. To calculate these additional
welfare costs of import barriers, It would be necessary to know the elasticity
of the physical capital stock with respect to divergences of q from 1. A
ten percent reduction in imports is calculated to reduce U.S. q by roughly
half of one percent.
Many of these calculations, and many of the observations that precede
them, have an unfamiliar flavor. It is worth reminding the reader therefore
in closing that most of the discussion is based on the marriage of two models
thatarein isolation both familiar and well understood. One is the standard
general—equilibriummodel with which commercial policy is usually analyzed
in pure trade theory (albeit without production substitution); the other is
theasset—approach/portfolio—balance model of exchange rates and international
asset trade. One lesson from the exercise is that we can't always predict
the personality of offspring from the personalities of parents. But the most
important lesson is that floating exchange rates do have serious implications
for the question of what commercial policy does.34
APPENDIXA
ALGEBRAIC MANIPULATION OF THE MEDIUM—RUN MODEL
Inthe mediumrun, Y1 = and substitution of equations (5) and (6)
into either (2.1) or (2.2) yields
0 =
—A1Y1+ A2(eY2) + cF; (Al)
where
= — (l_Oj)(l.i)(D./D.1),
and where is the shorthand notation adopted here for the function
Log differentiation of equation (Al) making use of equation (1) generates an
equation that links the endogenous Y1' Y2' F, and e ——or,more revealingly
for what follows, the endogenous ,Y2F, and Ce-F) ——tothe exogenous B12 and
B21, where for any variables Z, ZdZ/Z.
Log differentiation of equations (10) yields equations (A2.1) and (A2.2)
below, which use: the differentiated version of (9) to replace W; the dif-
ferentiated version of (4) to replace with —ri(c1 and K1 being con-
stant); the differentiated version of (3) to replace f 1 with —andf2 with
—r2 — and the relationship .=+.,where
e= (1—.)(D../D..) .— .fi..
1 113 11 iJ13135
The resulting equations are:













where E stands for the absolute value of the elasticity of variable Z
ZaZb
a
with respect to variable andwhereki81 y. are the shares of physical
capital and tradeable assets in i's total wealth.
Since in the medium run, Wdi =W1,the right hand sides of equations (8)
and(9)can be equated. Differentiation of the resulting equations and re-






+ -rf1 1 'kl f 1
- f2 -'- r=—[
2







These can be used to replace and on the right hand side of (A2.l) and
(A2 .2).
The resulting equations canbesolved for F and for (— F)to yield:
A lEL1,r1
+ 1kl + 1f1Akl+ 1f l)EL,wA
F=[1+











2 L2,r2 1f 2
L2,r2
where is the share of cashbalances in i's total wealth + +1f1 =
+
1f 2 =1).The sum of (A4) and (A5) then yields an equation that
expressesas a function of the endogenous Y's and the exogenous C11s.
Since by equations (3) and the assumption of perfect substitutability
among non—money assets (or really just a constant proportional rela-
tionship among their rates of return), r1 =r2,the right—hand sides of (A3.l)
and(A3.2)can be equated, and(A4)and(A5)canbeused to eliminate F and














The differentiated version of (Al), and (A4), (A5), and (A6) consti-
tute a system of 4 independent equations relating 4 endogenous unknowns ——
i' 2 and(or —)—— to2 exogenous import variables and D21.
and are solely dependent on and Solution of this 4x4 system
would give reduced—form expressions for all the variables, but those
for and are most useful. Once they are determined, F can be obtained
recursively using (A4) andcan be obtained recursively using the sum of
(A4) and (A5).



























are dependent solely on and D21 as sketched above.
Tobin's q is defined in the model as and the proportional
changeinits equilibrium value is therefore — k1
is equal to
—r1from equations (4), and an expression for in terms of Y1, l2'
and D21 can be obtained from equations (5) and (6). Equations (A3) and (A7)





is assumed to be equal to based on Kuznets (1959, P. 9 passim),
and is defined as the share in national income of income from assets ——
rentalincome, corporate profits, and net interest. For the U.S. in
1979, a 0.1888 =(30.5+ 196.8 + 143.4)/1963.3 (Source: Economic Report
of the President, January 1981, pp. 254—255).
Equation (5):
is defined as the share of imports in national absorption.
=(Valueof D21)/E1 =(Valueof D21)/(Gross National Product (GNP) in
1 —Valueof D12 + Value of D21) =0.1116=267.9/(2413.9—281.3+ 267.9)
(Source: Economic Report of the President, January 1981, p. 233).
=(Dollarvalue of D12)/(Dollar GNP in 2 —Dollarvalue of D21 +
Dollar value of D12) =0.0375=281.3/(7486.7—267.9+ 281.3). (The source
for dollar values of D12 and D21 is the same as above; the source for the
dollar value of world non—U.S. GNP is the 1981 edition of World Bank Atlas,
the sum of dollar GNP at market prices for all countries listed).
j()/D1
is equal to the absolute value of the own—price elasticity
of import dnand less 1. Stern, et al. (1976, p. 15 passim) suggest
—1.61 as the "best" estimate of the own—price elasticity of U.S. import
dnand,and —1.41 as the "best" estimate of the own—price elasticity of
foreign demand for imports from the U.S. Thusj()/D21
=0.66;40
( )/D1 =0.41.These estimates are crucial for parameterizing A in
Appendix A.
Equation (8):
is assumed to be equal to based on Kuznets (1959, pp. 17—20),
and is defined as the ratio of tangible assets (except military) to GNP.
For the U.S. on average from 1947 to 1958, y =3.600and was very stable
over that entire period. (Source: Goldsmith (1962, pp. 4, 117)). The
same value was assumed to hold in the late 1970's.
Equation (9):
Using y1 =W11Y1
= = w2IY2=3.600from Equation (8), a value
for the U.S. capital stock (puL1) at the end of 1979 can be obtained from
the equation W1 =3.600 =L+ p.R1 + pflF, and from values f or
($2,377,090 million in 1979 from the 1981 edition of World Bank Atlas),
for L1($389,800 million at the end of 1979 from the heading "money" in the
May 1981 issue of International Financial Statistics), and for Pf1F defined
as the net International investment position of the United States ($94,959
million at the end of 1979 from the August 1980 issue of the Survey of
Current Business, p. 51). From this a value of U.S. wealth at the end of
1979 can be calculated ($8,557,524 million) and U.S. wealth shares:
=0.0456,k1 =0.9434,1f =0.0111.Comparable wealth shares for
the rest of the world can be calculated from the equation eW2 =3.600(eY2)
=
eL2+ ep2K2 —ePf2Fand from values for eY2 ($7,486,653 million in 1979
from the 1981 edition of World Bank Atlas), for 2($1,834,038 million at
the end of 1979 from summing the product of money stocks and current
market exchange rates for all countries except the U.S. in the May 198141
issue of International Financial Statistics) andfor en F(= F f2 Pf1
($94,959 million as above). From this a dollar value ofglobal non—U.S.
wealth at the endof1979 can be calculated ($26,951,951 million) and
global non—U.S. wealth shares:y2 0.0536, 'k2 =0.9499,Yf2 =0.0035.
Equation (10):
A reasonable consensus estimate of the absolute values of E. and
EL was taken to be 0.7 based on Laidler (1977, P. 125 passim). Estimates
2'2
of EL andEL are much scarcer, especially In a money—demand
1,1 2'2
equation like (10) that inclues income as well as wealth. Goldfeld (1973,
p. 614, equation (4)) provides one such estimate for the U.S., for which
the medium—run counterpart is 0.118. That estimate of EL (and, by
1' 1
assumption, ELWis also almost exactly equal to the average of two such
2' 2
estimates provided by Neltzer (1963, p. 240), one for a narrow definition
of money and one for a broad definition of money.42
Equations (Al), (A7.l), and (A7.2).
Values of A1 are necessary to obtain a value of 6(= A2eY2/(A2eY2 + cF)).
Values of A1 depend on 0, arid D1/D11. The last two are obtained from
information above, and 01 is treated parametrically. For 01 =0,A1 =
—0.1172,A2 =—0.0357.For 0 0.5, A1 =—0.0028,A2 =0.0009.For
01 =1,A,1 =0.1116,A2 =0.0375.To obtain the corresponding values of
6 for the three values of 0,A2
and eY2 are obtained from the data above,
and eF is set equal (using equation 3.1) to r1Pf1F and thence (using
equation 4.1) to (alYl/pklKl)pflF, establishing its value at $5,280
million, For 010, 6 =1.0202.For 01 =0.5,6 =0.5593.For 01 =1,
6 =0.9815.It is worth noting thatforcertain values of 6can be
made to become 0 or to become infinitely large in a negative direction.
In both cases, the reduced form equations have finite limits, Equations
(A7.i), for example, suggest maximalvaluesof thatareroughly three
timesaslarge as those estimatedinTable 1. Not all other entries in
Table 1 wouldbethree timesaslarge, however, sincesome (e.g.the
effects on national consumption possibilities) are dominated by the
which are invariant to 6.43
FOOTNOTE S
'SeeMeade (1951, Chapter XXI), Mundell (1961), Tower (1973),
and Eichengreen (1980) among others.
observation has the same flavor and emerges for some of the
same reasons as Mussa's (1976, pp. 188 passim) conclusion that under
fixed exchange rates, a tariff may make the balance of payments and
the stock of official foreign exchange reserves either more positive
or more negative. Johnson (1966) and Eichengreen (1981) also demon-
strate the ambiguous effect that protection has on the exchange rate,
but in a model without asset trade. What raises the possibility there
is the presence of traded intermediate goods, with the resulting poten-
tial for negative (effective) protection. A recent empirical model of
this sort that yields similar conclusions is that of Deardorff and
Stern (1980).
3mis is theway of interpreting the neglect of any monetary
variables or exchange rates in standard pure—trade—theoretic approaches
to commercial policy. It also seems to be what Blackhurst and Tumlir
(1980, pp. 3, 13) have in mind when they remark, "The economic value of
trade liberalization is not affected by increased variability of nominal
exchange rates.... exchange rate fluctuations in no way reduce the im-
portance of efforts to liberalize world trade." For a strongly dissenting44
view, based on less familiar general—equilibrium models, see Chipman
(1978, 1980).
necessary condition is that import demand be own—price inelastic,
as noted by Meade (1951, pp. 279—280, 281) and Tower (1973, PP. 453).
5Boyer (1977, pp. 224—225, 228) rules out such effects explicitly.
Yet there seem to be no behavioral or conceptual grounds for doing so.
If there is reason to believe that commercial policy affects aggregate
income and price levels significantly, and if these in turn affect aggre-
gate asset preference significantly, then their influence cannot be
neglected on any second—order—of—smallness grounds. Nor can it be
neglected even when industry—specific commercial policy is analyzed
in a disaggregated multi—sectoral model. Although the aggregate income!
price effects of such industry—specific commercial policy maybesmall
(even infinitesimal), they will necessarily induce similarly dimensioned
small (or infinitesimal) effects on aggregate asset preference. The
asset preference effects therefore can never be small relative to the
income—price effects and should never be excluded. Boyer does ascribe
such an exclusion to Nundell (1961) and Sobmen (1969), but it seems
more exactly that they ruled out effects of commercial policy on real
savings and investment (no Laursen—Metzler effects), and said nothing
about asset preference.
natural reaction seems to be that these barriers to exchange—rate45
neutrality are quantitatively small. Yet it seems difficult to argue
that they are small relative to the traditional effects of commercial
policy and should therefore be ignored.
7A detailed discussion of the reduced form ofthe model for each
of its three time horizons (see below) seemed inappropriate in the text.
Reduced—form equations for the most important variables are derived in
Appendix A. Equations for others are implied there as well.
8See, for example, footnotes 5 and 6..
9Boyer's (1977), Eichengreen's (1980) and Djajic's (1981) models
start from the same perspective. But Eichengreen applies his to tariffs
only, and Boyer and Djajic apply theirs to border tax adjustments (equl—
proportional changes in import tariffs and export subsidies) that are
equivalent to devaluation—revaluation under pegged exchange rates, except
for their wealth effects. Only Djajic presents a fully symmetric bilateral
model. Boyer exploits the small—country assumption instead, and Eichengreen
suppresses some foreign repercussions. All obscure the way in which commer-
cial policy creates a transfer problem. Other similarities and differences
will be noted below.
10Despite mention of lump—sum transferpayments and neutral income
subsidies at one point, Boyer (1977, P. 225) appears to neglect them in
calculating income. This neglect is appropriate if Boyer's import tariff
revenues are used to finance his export subsidies. See also Djajic (1981,
p. 5).46
11This discussion reveals that 8. could also be treated as the share
of tariff revenues paid by one country to another as a result of any
compensation arrangements sanctioned by the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade.
12Boyer (1977) ignores this. Eichengreen (1980) avoids it by focusing
on non—interest—bearing monetary assets only. Djajic (1981) avoids it by
taxing it away domestically, and unilaterally transferring it back to the
foreign country.
'3The conclusions from thepaper will hold without alteration if
the assets are imperfect substitutes whose relative rates of return are
invariant to conimercialpolicy. Given this, or the stronger assumption
of perfect substitutability, it is straightforward, although cumbersome,
to allow international holdings of equities as well as non—secured finan-
cial assets.
14 earlier version of the paper allowed equations (4) to capture
what might be defended as an additional characteristic of modern conimer—
cial policy: what rent—like revenues it does create are likely to be
reflected in large part in profits, and distributed to owners of physi-
cal capital (equities), not to labor. This distributive concentration






and would be consistent with the institutional concentration of pricing,
hiring, and export decisions on owners of capital, and also with the
forces that continue to press management to pay workers only the value
of their marginal product. It is important in the specification to note
that when foreign sales are restricted, labor's marginal product is
worth the domestic price of the product, since additional output
must be sold domestically. Other specifications than (4) are of course
plausible. One could treat parametrically the division of commercial
policy's rent—like revenues between domestic labor and capital, as done
with e• for their international division. Or one could allocate commer—
1
cialpolicy's rent—like revenues only to owners of existing capital,
and not to those who might be induced to engage in long—run capital
formation (see below) because of altered investment incentives.
15The important implication of the literature on "rent—seeking"
(Krueger (1974), Bhagwati (1980), or for a context close to that of this
paper, Leith (1980)) ——that"rent—seeking" uses up resources ——is
avoided, however, by treating parametrically the internal and inter-
national distribution of "rents."
16 .. . Eachequation is of course unaffected ifeachvariable is made
"real" through deflation by some price index.
17Whentheright hand sides of (8) and (9) are set equal to each
other, and (10) is substituted in, the resulting equation is the implicit
portfoUo demand equation for non—money assets (made up of the perfectly
substitutable financial assets and equities). See Appendix B.48
'8Because .itselfis a function of p1./p.., the index does not
have fixed weights.
19The demand for cash balances must be wealth inelastic (see Henderson
(1980)) in order to assure stability, and also because otherwise simul-
taneous increases in the price level (P.) and nominal income (Y.), ceteris
paribus, would cause reduced demand for cash balances, an undesirable and
incredible result.
Eichengreen (1980) and Djajic (1981) focus on horizons with
endogenous expectations. Theirs are, in addition, rational.
21The capital stock might begin to adjust during the so—called
"medium" runaswell, as discussed below.
If capital represents accumulated foreign goods, as might be more
typical in developing countries, then its replacement cost is p1. If
two kinds of capital exist, being defined as productive stocks of the
two different kinds of output in the model, then matters become more
complex.
23See Neade (1951), Nundell (1961), Tower (1973), Eichengreen (1980),
among others.
24The short—run movement in the trade balance is the correspondent
to the short—run movement in income, of course.49
25Other parameters play a role as well,principally those from
portfolio behavior, in a complicated configuration. They, however, do
not seem capable by themselves of generating the anomalous link between
commercial policy, income, and the trade balance.
26There are feedback effects of thison flexible prices elsewhere
in the system but these are ignored in the verbal summary.
27Henderson and Rogoff (1981) containsextensive references and
further discussion.
28The same is true of otherasset prices and rates of return. They
may be made higher or lower in the medium run by commercial policy.
29Real income orconsumption possibilities might also be described as
real national purchasing power or welfare. It is defined as nominal income
deflated by a variable—weight index of the "national" cost of living:
(1 —1)p11/p1+ [02p21/p1 + (1 —O2)ep22/e°p2].The national cost
of living is composed of two elements: the price of domestic merchandise
and the average price to the nation of imported merchandise t.2p21 +
—0ei22Lreflecting the fact that foreign suppliers capture a share
eofthe rent—like revenues from modern commercial policy.50
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